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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
Coming to Geneva, I knew I wanted to conduct a research project that would allow me to 
take full advantage of the resources utterly unique to Geneva: namely, the UN repository 
and the vibrant community of diplomats. I am convinced that the best way to understand 
an issue is to listen and engage with as many viewpoints as possible. Every diplomat here 
in Geneva carries piece of his or her homeland’s political and social values. My goal was 
to find a topic that would allow me to interact with many of those philosophies. 
 
Throughout every briefing and reading with SIT related to the UN I was fixated on the 
inequality underlying our entire system on multilateral governance. Not knowing 
anything about the Security Council reform debate, I was certain that if I dug deeply 
enough I would be able to find viable proposals from various groups. The results have 
been sometimes intellectually discouraging but always fascinating. Just as I had hoped, 
my meetings with high-ranking diplomats were certainly some of the highlights of my 
semester in Switzerland. My sincerest gratitude to Michiel Combink, Peter Gooderham 
Toni Jacques, and Amr Roshdy for taking time out of their busy schedules to meet with 
me. Thank you, Mr. Roshdy, for your continued encouragement and willingness to 
answer my further questions after our interview. I would like to extend my thanks 
Sammy Yaish who encouraged me to undertake this topic even though I had already 
initially proposed a completely different project. A final thanks to my parents who 




For nearly two decades the international community has debated how to address 
reform of the United Nations Security Council. Many argue that it is imperative that the 
United Nations Security Council be reformed for the body to maintain its relevance and 
legitimacy in the Twenty-first Century. The original United Nations Charter endowed 
special voting privileges and permanent membership to the five powers that emerged 
victorious from World War Two. These five powers no longer describe the international 
world order. Various reform groups such as the Group of Four, The United for Consensus 
movement, and the Africa Group have proposed reform resolutions to address this 
discrepancy. Whatever shape reform takes will impact the future of the United Nations 




“With all its defects, with all the failures that we can check up against it, the UN 
still represents man’s best-organized hope to substitute the conference table for the 
battlefield
1
.” However often quoted and referenced, these words of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower hold as true today as when first uttered in 1961. The United Nations remains 
the closest approximation of a democratic parliament representing the views of nations 
from all corners of the globe. It is arguably closer today to global representation than 
during Eisenhower’s time. Over the next fifty years, the world would witness an 
enormous shake-up of the 1945 world order, including decolonization, the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, and the subsequent creation of many newly independent states. The 
overall composition of the United Nations’ General Assembly has thus shifted markedly. 
Despite these shifts and others, the Security Council of 2010 remains virtually unaltered 
from its conception in 1944.  
The need for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform is hardly a novel 
conception. Rather, as Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institute explains, “reform of the 
Security Council has long been high on the international agenda, but the only thing 
everyone agrees upon is that the current arrangement is deeply flawed”. Why then, has 
Security Council (SC) reform for so long stagnated? What is at stake if the Security 
Council fails to keep pace with the geopolitical realities of the 21
st
 Century? Many posit 
that the United Nations itself will become antiquated unless the gross imbalances of the 
Security Council are effectively addressed. Yet what would constitute a “fair” and 
                                                        
1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961. 
“representative” Security Council? Unfortunately, reaching a consensus on these essential 
points remains fantastically out of reach. This paper puts forth the views and arguments 
of several major emerging economic and political powers as well as their regional 
contenders. These emerging powers share many ideological claims to Security Council 
representation: it is these powers that are now rising to challenge the Charter-enshrined 
power of the Permanent-5 (P5). P5 is the commonplace term for the five nations (The 
People’s Republic of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States) that won World War Two (WWII) and were 
thence given permanent seats on the Security Council. This paper also addresses the 
interests and rights of developing nations as well as middle-sized powers. What solution 
can be reached when the P5 hold the ability to prevent any change and do not wish to 
share their privileges with other nations? 
The stated purpose of the United Nations is commendable indeed: to rid the world 
of war, preserve fundamental human rights, further freedom and living standards for all, 
strengthen international peace and security, and to accomplish all these ends through 
tolerant and democratic means
2
. Paul Kennedy provocatively concludes his book, The 
Parliament of Man, with the following question; “The original preamble to the Charter of 
the United Nations had it right. The question is, can we do it?
3
” Indeed the onus for 
responsible reform lies with the international community as a whole. It remains to be 
seen if the demands of emerging powers will be sufficiently met in order to preserve the 
original aspirations of the United Nations. 
 
                                                        
2 qd. Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (New York: Random House, 2006), 
United Nations Charter 
3 Ibis. Paul Kennedy, 279. 
2. The Roots of the United Nations Security Council 
 
a. The League of Nations and World War One 
 
Before the views and arguments of these emerging powers can be adequately 
analyzed, we must turn our attention to the foundation and history of the Security Council 
in the Twentieth Century. Above all, it is imperative that one bear in mind that the 
Charter of the United Nations still in effect today remains rooted in the dual legacies of 
the failed League of Nations and the post- WWII world order from which it arose. It is 
commonly believed that the League of Nations was already doomed when the United 
States’ Congress refused to allow the US to become member to the organization. The 
United States emerged from World War I unrivaled by the countries of most of the world 
and, crucially, politically determined to avoid future entanglement with “European 
problems.” This sentiment of isolationism thus prevented the US from joining the League 
of Nations, greatly weakening the League’s legitimacy and international power projection 
capability. Furthermore, Russia, Italy, and Germany had little incentive to remain in the 
League and thus revoked their membership believing that it was no longer politically 
fruitful. At the outbreak of WWII, the League of Nations was a moribund institution, 
totally incapable of protecting the world from the “scourge of war”. Therefore the United 
Nations, and particularly the United Nations Security Council UNSC, was formed with 
the aim of retaining the most powerful post-WWII powers in the UN to prevent a 
breakdown of world order such as that which transpired after WWI. 
The desire to retain the emergent victorious powers of WWII within the UN 
system manifested itself in the structure and generous mandate given to the Security 
Council. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America 
were given both permanent Security Council membership and the de facto power of a 
veto because all decisions require consensus from the P5. What is often forgotten is that 
veto power was given with the express directive that it should not be used unless 
international peace and security is at risk. In other words, the P5 weren’t intended to use 
the requirement of P5 consensus to promote their national political stances of the 
permanent five members
4
. The Security Council is also comprised of ten nonpermanent 
members that are elected from the General Assembly and serve two-year terms that are 
not immediately renewable. Over time it has been established through precedent that of 
these ten nonpermanent members three are from Africa, two from Asia, two from South 
America, two from the “Western Europe and Others Group”, and one from Eastern 
Europe.  
Additionally, the Charter of the United Nations expressly states that military 
action taken at the behest of the Security Council should only take place in collaboration 
with the Military Staff Committee. Members of the Military Staff Committee were 
intended to be chosen democratically however the body was defunct practically before it 
was implemented. The Charter included no means for either limiting the use of the veto 
by consensus voting or ensuring the inclusion of the Military Staff Committee and thus 
the Security Council took on a political life of its own. Once again, this leeway resulted 
from the belief that a UN that included and was somewhat controlled by the major world 
                                                        
4 Ibis. Paul Kennedy, 62. 





b. Cold War Power Plays 
 
Cold War enmity between the US and the USSR dictated the agenda and role of 
the Security Council during that period. It also had a profound impact on setting 
precedent for the usage of the veto power. Neither the US nor the USSR wanted to 
commit troops to a military action that would be under joint command with the Military 
Staff Committee therefore that body was sidelined. In moves that could be considered to 
be contrary to the original vision of the Charter, the USSR began to use its veto power 
with purely political motivations. The only reason the US was less engaged in this 
activity was that it benefited from broader support on the SC and generally did not come 




c. Post-Cold War 1990s Security Council “Activist” Voting 
 
The breakup of the Soviet Union led to a new period in Security Council 
behavior. With the Cold War over, Russia (who formally replaced the USSR on the 
Security Council) was far too weak to pose any threat to the US. Without these two 
powers checking each other, it became much easier for the Council to authorize more and 
                                                        
5 Jose Alvarez “Judging the Security Council” The American Journal of International Law (Jan 1996), 21 
6 Op. cit. Paul Kennedy, 47. 
more peace enforcement missions. Of the P-5, only China resisted this new wave of so-
called “activist voting” on the Security Council
7
. 
The peacekeeping missions of the 1990s took place almost exclusively in the 
developing global South whereas the P5 states are all industrialized nations and 
predominantly Western. This discrepancy has fueled much of the discussion about the 
need for reform of the Security Council. As South African Counsellor of Disarmament 
Michiel Combrink phrases the point, “The global South is left wondering who is making 
the decisions and on whose behalf”
8
. The Security Council’s failure to act in the atrocious 
African Great Lakes (Rwanda &Burundi) genocide is a particularly poignant illustration 
to some of how the political agendas of the P5 states have too much sway on where the 
Security Council chooses to act. Many in Africa believe that if an African nation had 
been a permanent Security Council member at that time, hundreds of thousands of 
African lives would have been saved
9
. 
As a greater number of states grow economically and politically, these players 
have begun to express their lack of trust in the ability of the Security Council to fairly and 
responsibly deliver resolutions
10
. These states speak of their deservingness of a 
permanent SC seat in terms of the “legitimacy” that their presence would offer. The 
common discourse is that if the Security Council is not reformed soon such that it reflects 
21
st
 Century geopolitical realities, UN member states will cease to take its decisions 
seriously and SC resolutions will be much less enforced. Academic Ian Hurd, however, 
proposes that states speak in terms of Council “legitimacy” as a universal cover for their 
                                                        
7 Linda Melvern “The Security Council: Behind the Scenes,” International Affaires (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 
Jan 2001: 107. 
8 Interview with Michiel Combrink, Counsellor of Disarmament at the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN in Geneva, 16 
November 2010. 
9 Op. cit. Interview with MIchiel Combrink 
10 Jose Alvarez “Judging the Security Council” The American Journal of International Law, Jan 1996: 17. 
real particularistic, national interests in gaining a permanent seat. He goes on to conclude 
that the legitimacy rhetoric, while perhaps not the true concern of states contending for a 




d. The Security Council in the Twenty-First Century: P5 Domination 
 
Calls for reform of the UNSC center around two major flaws in the current 
system: the makeup of the SC body and the working methods of the SC. 
The permanent five members of the Security Council indisputably continue to 
maintain a stronghold on the decision making of the Council body. To begin with, the 
practical experience of continuous membership for the past 65 years endows them with a 
well-run bureaucratic team on the Security Council. Each time a nonpermanent member 
begins its term, it much integrate into the Council whereas the P5 are continuously 
central to its operations. Even more significantly, the veto power means that the P5 are 
vital to every decision taken on by the Council, even if it is unrelated to their national or 
regional interests. Though the UN Charter confers on the Security Council “the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
12
,” there are no 
explicit limits on veto usage. Academic discourse surrounding the veto has become 
increasingly critical in the past decades; Nirupam Sen aptly describes general (non-P5) 
sentiment when she writes, “the veto was designed to protect national interests and 
logically has no place in the protection of individual rights
13
.” There is a growing 
consensus in the international community that the P5 has cast the veto far too often and 
                                                        
11 Ian Hurd. “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform” 213. 
12 qd. Paul Kennedy “The Parliament of Man”, The Charter of the United Nations: 321. 
13 Nirupam Sen “Nonstate Threats and the Principled Reform of the UN” Ethics & International Affairs. 2006: 232. 
inappropriately. Consider the following statistics: since the inception of the UNSC, 59 
vetoes have been cast to block the admission of member states to the UN and 43 have 
been cast to block nominees for Secretary General. At the same time, no veto has ever 
been cast to stop a war. Many UN member states object to the mentality that the 
preservation of international peace and security has been interpreted militarily almost 
exclusively
14
. Of the 186 countries eligible for nonpermanent membership in the Security 
Council, 77 countries have never been able to serve – that is over 41%. The permanent 
members are able to block any state they do not wish to serve with on the UNSC. 
Additionally, the veto power has enabled the permanent members to maintain de jure or 
de facto membership in almost every principle UN body and organ. In other words, the 
P5 hold special status and power throughout the entire UN system because of the veto.
15
 
The veto has led not only to the P5 stranglehold on UNSC decisions, but also has 
contributed to the lack of transparency in the working methods of the Council. Currently, 
the UNSC functions as follows: the P5 discuss an issue behind closed doors, when they 
have made their decision they invite the nonpermanent members to read the resolution 
and in certain cases make a comment, then, the entire Council signs the resolution in the 
large conference hall open to the press.
16
 What goes on behind those closed doors is 
entirely unknown because full records are not kept of the proceedings and the P5 are not 
required to submit an explanation for their vetoes. Amr Roshdy highlighted this point in 
his 2005 address at the “UN @ 60” Conference in Pretoria, South Africa; “no researcher 
will, ever, be able to study the records of deliberations of Security Council members. 
                                                        
14 Op. cit. Interview with Michiel Combrink; Op. cit. Interview with Aditya Desai, Indian businessman, at a café in Geneva, 5 
November 2010 
15 Amr Roshdy, “Why the Security Council could not be reformed” Enough will was not enough,” Paper prepared for UN @ 60 
Conference. Pretoria, South Africa. Oct 2005: 3 
16 Op. cit. Interview with Michiel Combrink; Op. cit. Interview with Amr Roshdy 
There are no such records”.
17
 The only records of UNSC discussions are short summaries 
sent to the Secretary General for his eyes only. “The Security Council is not accountable 
to the General Assembly, the “popular” chamber [of the UN]. Furthermore, the Security 




3. Regional Security Council Contenders and their Detractors 
 
The one fact that practically every diplomat and political observer can agree to (at 
least on the surface) is that the UNSC must be reformed. Unfortunately, there is zero 
consensus on what shape that reform should take or even on basic considerations such as 
how SC actions should be different, what should be the metric for measuring 
representativeness, what will make the UNSC maximally legitimate in the eyes of the 
world? One obvious yet oft overlooked setback is that there is no such entity as “the eyes 
of the world”
19
. There is no panacea for the Security Council quagmire that could 
possibly satisfy the national interests of all states. Whatever reform does eventually come 
to pass, it is inconceivable that every contending nation will be satisfied. In brief, here are 





                                                        
17 Amr Roshdy, “Why the Security Council could not be reformed” Enough will was not enough,” Paper prepared for UN @ 60 
Conference. Pretoria, South Africa. Oct 2005: 1 
18 Albert Venter, “Reform of the United Nations Security Council: A Comment on the South African Position,” International Journal 
on World Peace, 2003: 40. 
19  Ian Hurd. “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform” Global Governance (Apr-June 
2008) 
Two of the P5 members herald from Europe: France and the United Kingdom. 
Though these two nations have long held great power on the world stage, their economies 
today are not nearly as dominant as they were coming out of WWII. In 2009, the United 
Kingdom contributed 6.6 % of the annual budget while France contributed 6.3 %. They 
were the fourth and fifth highest contributors to the United Nations behind the US (22%, 
the maximum allowed) and nonpermanent members Japan (16.6%) and fellow European 
state Germany (8.5%). France and the UK enjoy the highest level of international power 
projection of any European states, largely because of their status within the UNSC. To 
Germany, this modern reality is wholly unfair and outdated.  
Germany argues that its booming economy – far more powerful than current 
European SC members France and the UK – merits it a spot on the council. Additionally, 
Germany argues that its exclusion is an unfair relic of post WW2 world order. Germany’s 
candidacy dates back to the early 1990s. Though much diplomatic progress has been 
made towards a German permanent seat, not official advancement has been made apart 
from submitting an unsuccessful resolution to the UN General Assembly. Italy and Spain 
object to any scheme favoring Germany over themselves.
20
 These countries would rather 
see an increase in non-permanent seats for which all Western European states would 
compete. They have helped create the United for Consensus movement to achieve these 
aims. Furthermore, the European Union body would like to instead see a permanent EU 
seat, further complicating the politics of that region. This is unlikely to take place in the 
near future given the EU’s surfeit of internal turmoil.  
 
b. Asia 
                                                        
20 Interview with Toni Jacques, First Secretary of the Mexican Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, 10 November 2010. 
 
Japan has long argued that as the consistent second ranking contributor to the UN 
preceded only by the US, along with a track record of nuclear disarmament and peace 
building, its inclusion as a permanent UNSC member would be logical
21
. Permanent 
member China, however, balks at the suggestion that Japan has paid its dues for the 
atrocities of WW2II (a sincerely felt argument that nonetheless likely masks the 
additional fact that China simply wants to remain the only Asian SC permanent 
member)
22
. Under the Charter, the Security Council structure cannot be altered if any 
permanent member vetoes the proposed change. Therefore, as long as Japanese 
membership remains anathema to China’s interests, nothing will move forward. 
Additionally, Japan has essentially no support from its Asian neighbors. North and South 
Korea are both fundamentally opposed to Japan gaining a permanent seat as they 
continue to view Japan as their enemy
23
. 
India also stakes claim to a seat as one of the most populous nations in an under 
represented region, one of the world’s fastest growing economies, representing a sixth of 
the world’s population. Pakistan has long stood in opposition of India gaining a 
permanent seat citing obvious fears for its own national interests. President Barack 
Obama’s November 2010 endorsement of India for a permanent SC seat stoked the 
rhetorical flame about India’s candidacy. In the eyes of Egyptian diplomat Amr Roshdy, 
the endorsement was a well calculated political move because it cost Obama and the 
United States very little and gained Indian support leading up to the G20 summit in 
                                                        
21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security” (Tokyo, Japan, 2004), 
7. 
22 Interview with Amr Roshdy, Foreign Ministry of the Arab Republic of Egypt, The Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to 
Geneva, 2 November 2010. 
23 Yehuda Blum. “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform” The American Journal of International Law. 646. 
Seoul. Though Pakistan was enraged and alarmed by the endorsement, it is still fully 
reliant on US aid and could not retaliate with anything beyond rhetoric
24
.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s Japan and India, along with Germany and 
Brazil, began to support each other’s bids for permanent seats in an grouping known as 
the “G4”. (See Section 4a for more information). 
 
c. Latin America 
 
In Latin America, Brazil echoes similar claims as India; it is a booming economic 
power and could represent a region that currently has no permanent representation. Both 
Argentina and Mexico object to the claim that Brazil is the natural candidate to 
permanently represent their diverse region. One example of Mexico and Brazil’s 
diverging foreign policy agendas cited by Toni Jacques, representative to the Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva pertains to weapons controls. While Brazil and Mexico share 
the conviction that the world should be a nuclear free zone, Brazil is a major producer of 
small arms. Disarmament is central to the Mexican foreign policy vision and Mexico is 




Granting Brazil permanent membership, in the eyes of many Latin American and 
Caribbean nations, would impair the ability of other Latin American nations to break into 
the elite SC circle in the future. Not only would regional contenders such as Argentina 
and Mexico be unable to gain a permanent seat if Brazil gains exclusive right to that 
                                                        
24 Op. cit. Interview with Amr Roshdy 
25 Op. cit. Interview with Toni Jacques. 
privilege, but one less nonpermanent seat would be allocated to the region. The many 
small island states of the Caribbean have long felt under represented on the UNSC: these 
small island states make up a huge number of the 77 states that have never served on the 
UNSC. Many of these small states fear that far from bringing representation to their 
region, Brazil as a permanent member would actually limit the likelihood that their voices 




 All African nations agree that their continent deserves far greater representation 
on the Security Council. Africa is, in fact, the only continent with a unified proposal for 
reform; the Ezulwini Consensus, adopted in 2005. Africa will not settle for less than two 
permanent seats with veto powers and five nonpermanent seats: one allocated for each 
other five regions of Africa on a rotating basis. Ezulwini has been reaffirmed at every 
biannual summit of the African Union since its adoption. The three major points of 
tension between the Common African Position and the G4 proposal relate to: 1) the veto 
rights of new permanent members, 2) the proposed number of permanent African 
members, and 3) the proposed number of non-permanent members.  
Africa believes that without the veto power, new permanent members would be 
ineffective and unimportant in relation to the current Permanent Five; in other words, the 
current power balance would remain unaltered
26
. The Ezulwini Consensus explicitly 
states that, “even though Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, it is of the view that 
                                                        
26 African Union Executive Council, 7th Extraordinary Session. “The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United 
Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus” (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 2005), 2. 
so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all 
permanent members of the Security Council”
27
. With most proposed schemes, Asia 
would receive three permanent seats and Western Europe alone three permanent seats – 
not to mention Western-bent USA. Africa believes it is already a major concession to ask 
for just two permanent seats out of a 11 permanent seats proposed by both the G4 and 
one of the two UN High-Level Panels on reform. Africa makes up more than 27% of UN 
General Assembly membership but would only receive 18% of UNSC seats. The P5 also 
object to the Ezulwini Consensus proposed method of selected Africa’s permanent 
members. The African Union would like to select a group of candidate states to then be 
sent to the General Assembly for a vote. This is how non-permanent members are 
currently selected. 
Latin America and Africa are the only continents with no permanent member on 
the Security Council but Africa, furthermore, has no representative amongst the G4 
hopefuls while Latin America at least has aspirant Brazil. African sentiment seems to be 
that they are the least represented in the current UNSC format and in most reform 
schemes
28
. Much of the tension related to Security Council reform in Asian, European, 
and Latin America relate to the fear of mid-sized states who believe that elevating the 
status of their large neighbors will not help represent their needs but would simply lower 
their international status in comparison. Africa, with no current representation, feels that 
it can only stand to gain with the addition of African seats. 
When the United Nations was conceived the vast majority of Africa’s modern 
nations were not yet decolonized, independent states. The make-up of the General 
                                                        
27 Ibis. African Union Executive Council, 1. 
28 Op. cit. Interview with Michiel Combrink; Op. cit. Interview with Amr Roshdy. 
Assembly has thus changed immensely and the Security Council has not followed suit. 
According to Ambassador Roshdy of Egypt, African delegates are currently focusing on 
ensuring two permanent seats for Africa and have not yet opened discussions on which 
states those will be
29
. It is most advantageous to Africa to postpone that discussion in 
order to maintain a united front wherein all African states agree that more permanent 
African representation is vital. In international discussion, South Africa has garnered the 
most attention for a permanent seat given its rapidly advancing economy. South African 
Counsellor Combrink explained that when informal discussions about which African 
states would hold the permanent seats, South Africa was not initially convinced it wanted 
to take up the mantel
30
. Holding a Security Council seat does bring prestige to a country 
but it is also time-consuming, costly, and places states in a position where they are bound 
to make unpopular decisions. Furthermore, South Africa was not convinced that any state 
without permanent status and veto power could actual make an impact
31
. South Africa 
believes strongly in the UN body, particularly given its creation in the wake of the 
apartheid regime. “South Africa is a creation of the international community” and that 
origin continues to impact the way South Africa approaches international relations; with 
extreme emphasis on multilateralism and cooperation
32
. After South Africa served on the 
SC as a non-permanent member from 2006 to 2008, the tide of national political opinion 
began to shift in the direction of pursuing a permanent seat. South Africa saw that it 
could be incredibly useful in areas related to economic recovery and peacekeeping given 
its recent history
33
. According to South African Ambassador Combrink, South Africa 
                                                        
29 Op. cit. Interview with Amr Roshdy 
30 Op. cit. Interview with Michiel Combrink 
31 Op. cit. Albert Venter, 34-35. 
32 Op. cit. Interview with Michiel Combrink. 
33 Ibis. Interview with Michiel Combrink. 
believes its major achievement during the ’06-’08 term was strengthening the relationship 
between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council – the 
regional body responsible for the same objects as the UNSC
34
. Additionally, South Africa 
now believes that it can offer legitimacy to Security Council measures and actions in 
Africa, which are disproportionately prevalent Security Council issues.
35
 South Africa 
believes, Combrink added, that other strong African nations such as Nigeria and Egypt 
could also offer this critical credibility to the Security Council
36
. Nigeria holds Africa’s 
largest population and is one of the continent’s fastest growing economies. Given 
international involvement in the oil industry in Africa, many believe that oil-rich Nigeria 
could offer crucial perspectives to the Council. Egypt believes that its combined 
associations with Africa and the Middle East/Muslim culture merit it a permanent seat on 
the Council. Ambassador Roshdy opined that ignoring the fact that 1,100 million of the 
world’s citizens are Muslim and 400 million are Arab when envisioning the permanent 




The P5, however, are uncomfortable accepting new permanent members into their 
fold without knowing who they are. When asked why this was the case given the fact that 
the Security Council is a body designed to represent the interests of the General 
Assembly, UK ambassador Peter Gooderham responded that the UK would indeed be 
very uncomfortable with that scenario because a state like Libya could be given a seat
38
. 
Still, with 53 votes in the General Assembly, the continent of Africa remains an elusive 
                                                        
34 Ibis. Interview with Michiel Combrink 
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and critical voting bloc for all groups attempting to pass Security Council reform 
resolutions. 
 
4. Unprecedented Interregional Alliances 
 
What common vision does Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and 
Switzerland share? What unites Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, and Spain? Why is 
the three continent-strong alliance between Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan a 
commonly accepted international relations reality? Each of these groups, along with the 
Africa Group, presented a multilateral resolution for UNSC reform to the 2005 UN 
General Assembly. None of the resolutions even arrived at a vote because they all lacked 
adequate support. Even the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), with members from 77 
countries throughout the globe originally brought together in response to the bipolar Cold 
War environment, has drafted a UNSC reform proposal. At no other epoch in human 
history have powers from such disparate lands had the incentive to join together with a 
common vision. 
 
a.    The Permanent Five (P5): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, The United States of America 
 
The P5 are very different from the other interregional groups discussed in this 
section because their common interest is to preserve the national power that they hold 
within the existing UNSC system. Each of the five, however, approaches this goal in a 
very different manner. 
The P5 not only dominate the decisions of the Security Council today, but also 
have the final say in any proposed reform to its makeup. Therefore, even if all of the 187 
other countries in the United Nations voted that the P5 should no long hold the veto right, 
or that one of the P5 should lose it’s privileged status, the P5 countries could veto that 
vote. The conflict of interest inherent to this arrangement is evident to all involved with 
the UN – even the P5. The P5 are politically unable to openly oppose talks of UNSC 
reform because it is so flagrantly obvious that the system is outdated and unfairly 
advantages five nations
39
; some of whom are far from the major economic and political 




 and are certainly not representative of the world population. 
Therefore, the official stance of all five permanent members is that they are open to 
negotiations about Security Council reform.  
The basic positions of the P5 are as follows. Though the US and Russia outwardly 
promote reform, they will not accept a Security Council larger than 21 members or any 
reform plan which eliminates their veto power. The UK and France promote an “interim 
road map” wherein a new category of members (“semi-permanent”) are elected for longer 
terms and are eligible to reelection. Ambassador Gooderham of the UK states that his 
country prefers the G4 plan but believes that an intermediate option has a greater chance 
of passing
41
. China has voiced support for both the African Group and the United for 
Consensus movement: endorsements that do not at all go hand in hand. According to an 
African diplomat who chose to remain anonymous, the Chinese only support the African 
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position because they have strategic economic interest in Africa and are certain that the 
African proposal won’t garner enough momentum to be successful. China has historically 
abstained more and blocked far fewer votes in the UNSC. The UK and France advocate 
for an “intermediate solution” to reform; adding non-permanent seats for longer terms 
that are eligible for reelection. UK diplomat Mr. Gooderham posited that these seats 
would eventually naturally evolve into permanent seats
42
. Anonymous South Korean 
diplomat opined that it was no wonder that France and UK vocally increased their 
support for the “intermediate solution” in the wake of the European economic crisis. 
Without Germany, the EU would not have been able to bail out Greece. Newly 
empowered Germany felt even more entitled to a UNSC seat than ever given this overt 
signal that it was more powerful than France and the UK.  
 
b. The Great Four (G4): Brazil, Germany, India, Japan 
 
Germany and Japan have been campaigning for permanent seats on the Security 
Council since the early 1990s. Both argue that their financial contributions to the UN 
budget merit greater say in the primary decision making organ of the body. At 20% of the 
overall UN budget, Japan’s contributions are second only to the United States while 
Germany contributes the third greatest sum: far more than any of the other permanent 
Security Council members. During his time in office, President Clinton strongly 
advocated for the “fast track” solution to the misrepresentative permanent Security 
Council composition by simply adding Germany and Japan without any other reforms. 
This proposal never came to fruition because it held no benefit for the majority of 
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General Assembly members
43
. Indeed, the amendment process is formidable enough that 
in the official UN Charter in effect today Germany and Japan, along with Italy, are still 
referred to as enemy states. Therefore, a full forty percent of the UN budget is funded by 
states that are officially enemies. 
 In 2000, Brazil and India joined in discussions with Germany and Japan. Brazil 
and India boast massive economies that are only projected to grow in the coming 
decades. Additionally, their presence on the Security Council would greatly increase 
regional representation. Various members of the P5 have endorsed G4 members at 
different points of the past ten years. Though endorsement is significant in that the P5 
must eventually approve any additional permanent members, the actual act of endorsing 
leads to no action. The concrete arguments for elevating the G4 to permanent status have 
not changed in the past decade; they have simply been reiterated in each available forum. 
The official G4 proposal includes no specific mention of Brazil, Germany, India, and 
Japan but is submitted in their name and it is widely understood that they would be 
granted the additional permanent seats apportioned to their respective regions
44
. The 
proposal allocates new permanent seats to; two African states, two Asian states, one Latin 
American and Caribbean State, and one state from the Western European and Other 
Group (which includes Western Europe, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand). In 
addition to new permanent members, the G4 proposal calls for one new nonpermanent 
state from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Virtually 
all organized opposition to the G4 proposal originates from the regional rivalries 
explained previously. 
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The scene changed somewhat in 2006 when Japan began to campaign for a seat 
independent of the other three G4 states. The official comprehensive reform package 
would include all four states in an attempt to cater to as many regions as possible. 
Nonetheless Japan is now engaged with both the G4 and its independent route to the 
Security Council – reminiscent of the 1990s “fast track” approach promoted by former 
President Clinton. 
 
c. United for Consensus (UfC): Argentina, Canada, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, 
South Korea, Spain, Turkey and others 
 
The United for Consensus group originated from a Thursday morning “coffee 
club” of delegates to New York from Italy, Spain, Mexico, and Pakistan. These four 
countries saw the building momentum of the G4 states as a deeply troubling threat to 
their national interests. None of the United for Consensus nations believed that the G4 
member(s) from their region would represent their national viewpoints
45
. Pakistan fears 
that, far from merely not representing their national interests, Indian inclusion as a 
permanent member would completely compromise Pakistan’s interests. Mexico is not 
militarily threatened by Brazil but, according to Secretary Toni Jacques, “It is shocking to 
assume that Brazil ideologically represents the entire continent”
46
. Currently Italy and 
Spain occupy a similar rung of power within Europe as Germany. As Germany’s 
economy continues to grow and even carries the rest of the European Union, one of the 
only factors preventing Germany from completely dominating European politics is the 
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permanent Security Council status that separates it from otherwise much less powerful 
France and Great Britain. Over time South Korea has become integral to the United for 
Consensus movement, partly in response to fears of neighbor Japan with an elevated 
status. 
The United for Consensus proposal calls for an additional ten non-permanent 
members and no new permanent members. To address the imbalance of power between 
permanent and nonpermanent the UfC draft suggests requiring a majority of 15 
affirmative votes out of 25 members to pass a Security Council resolution
47
. The UfC 
platform is not explicitly opposed to the veto power – essentially because that is a 
politically untenable position – but privately, most UfC member states feel the veto is 
immoral
48
. The UfC proposal submits that if regional groups so decide, their members 
should be eligible for immediate reelection to the Council in the non-permanent category. 
The non-permanent seats would be divided as follows; six to Africa, five to Asia, four to 
Latin America and the Caribbean, three to Western Europe and other states, and two to 
Eastern Europe. UfC reasoning follows that if nonpermanent seats are eligible for 
reelection, they will be more accountable to the General Assembly for their actions
49
.  
The basic philosophy of the United for Consensus movement is that the UNSC 
should be as democratic and flexible as possible. As an anonymous South Korean 
diplomat explained, there is no way to predict future politics, so a democratic, electoral 
system is the best solution; “international politics is not permanent, and permanent 
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solutions will not work.
50
” UfC members argue that their solution makes the most logical 
sense from an unbiased perspective and is the only solution that will work in the long 
term.  
 
e. The Small Five (S5): Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Switzerland 
 
Costa Rica, Jordan, Lichtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland, who call 
themselves the “Small Five” (S5), have joined together to propose focusing on reform of 
the working methods of the SC
51
. Permanent members can only be added to the SC with 
an amendment of the UN Charter. To do so requires ratifying the new UN Charter in the 
Congresses of at least a 2/3 majority of member states; an unwieldy, complex, and 
expensive proposition. As states that are quite small yet nonetheless regionally 
influential, these states see themselves as potential losers of a reform scheme that greatly 
increases permanent membership for larger regional powers. By focusing the debate on 
increasing the transparency and accountability of the current Security Council, the S5 
hope to direct the discussion away from additional permanent members. The P5 have not 
commented directly on the S5 proposal because it is politically unsupportable for them to 
outwardly oppose it but not in their interest to increase oversight of their actions. The G4 
agree that Security Council working methods should be reformed but are uninterested in 
the S5 proposal because it does not include additional permanent Security Council 
members. Egyptian ambassador Roshdy believes that unless the S5 proposal becomes 
                                                        
50 Op. cit. Interview with anonymous South Korean Diplomat 
51 U.N. General Assembly 60th Session (A/60/L.49) “Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit: Costa Rica, Jordan, 
Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland: draft resolution: Improving the working methods of the Security Council” (New York. 
2006), 2 
more drastic and substantial it will gain no traction because the General Assembly is 




5. Reform in Sight? The Momentum and Failure of 2005 
 
a. Why so Many Thought the Time Was Right 
 
In the early years of the twentieth Century a concatenation of world events gave 
momentum to the G4 proposal for Security Council reform. The terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center, the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan and the unauthorized 
invasion of Iraq, and Kofi Annan’s desire to shape the UN institution before he left office 
made 2005 a year when many thought the time was ripe for reform. 
 
i. The September 11 attacks and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States launched a counter-offensive on 
Afghanistan. This war, coupled with the 2003 invasion of Iraq drastically drained the 
United States’ resources. The cost of the wars was exacerbated by the fact that the US, 
along with a coalition of forces, invaded Iraq without an affirmative resolution from the 
Security Council. It quickly became clear that the war would not imminently conclude 
and that the US was accordingly going to require financial assistance from other states. 
Economic giants Japan and German began to contribute significantly to the US war 
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effort. The G4 felt that this monetary assistance could be used to 1) prove that they are 




ii. The end of Kofi Annan’s term as Secretary General and the High-Level 
Panel on UN Reform 
 
The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) was established in 1992 but had not 
achieved any real progress in its first decade. In UN committees, the term “Open-Ended” 
means that any state or interested organization is free to contribute their opinions to the 
debate though only members of the UN General Assembly can cast a vote in committee 
decisions
54
. Given the history of the OEWG of indefatigably sifting through every nicety 
related to UN reform without producing any proposal of substance, the joke among 
experts is that the committee is unending rather than Open-Ended
55
. Secretary General 
Kofi Annan would soon conclude his time in office and wanted to first make progress in 
SC reform. Annan openly expressed his belief that the Security Council specifically 
needed reform stating that, “a change in the Council’s composition is needed to make it 
more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as of the 
geopolitical realities of today, and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of the world”
56
. 
Annan accordingly commissioned a High-Level Panel to submit recommendations for 
reform of all branches of the UN, which was published at the end of 2004. The High-
Level Panel put forth that; “the effectiveness of the global collective security system [The 
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Security Council]… depends ultimately not on only the legality of decisions but on 
common perceptions of their legitimacy”
57
. The report included two proposals for reform 
of the Security Council: the only area of the report in which an alternative was given.
58
 
Model A proposed adding new permanent as well as nonpermanent seats whereas Model 
B proposed adding nonpermanent seats as well as four-year, renewable seats. Tables 
detailing the regional distribution of seats of the two models proposed by the High-Panel 
are included below. The grey shaded areas are the proposed changes: 
 








Proposed two year seats 
(non-renewable) Total 
Africa 53 0 2 4 6 
Asia and Pacific 56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 47 3 1 2 6 
Americas 35 1 1 4 6 
Total 191 5 6 13 24 
 








Proposed four year 
renewable seats 
Proposed two year seats 
(non-renewable) Total 
Africa 53 0 2 4 6 
Asia and Pacific 56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 47 3 2 1 6 
Americas 35 1 2 3 6 
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 The G4 reform proposal closely resembles Model A whereas the United for 
Consensus proposal is more similar to Model B. Each group thus began to champion their 
respective Model. Model A is almost precisely what the G4 call for though the High-
Panel did not state that new permanent members would be granted veto rights. Instead, 
the report promoted gradually phasing out the veto altogether and not introducing it to 
any new powers. Specifically, the report stated that, “the institution of the veto has an 
anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic 
age and we would urge that its use be limited to matters where vital interests are 
genuinely at stake”
60
. The G4 were willing to cede that power if it meant finally pushing 
through reform that included their states as permanent members. The United for 
Consensus movement prefers adding purely nonpermanent, two-year seats with no option 
for election so as not to create a middle status tier on the Security Council. Even so, 
Model B provided a solid basis from which the UfC group could promote its proposal, 
thereby working against the G4. 
 
iii.  The Culmination: The 59th Session of the UN General Assembly 
 
The 2005 General Assembly session remains the closest the G4 have come to 
putting their proposal to a vote
61
. The magic number during that 59
th
 General Assembly 
became 128: the number of states the G4 had to convince to go along with their plan in 
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order to put it through the General Assembly. No one harbored the illusion that the 
United for Consensus group would gain enough seats to pass their resolution. To block 
the G4 from pushing through its reform proposal, the United for Consensus group had to 
gather 65 votes. Neither group came close to the requisite number of seats to achieve 
their ends and thus both resolutions were withdrawn before they came to a vote. The 
dialogue between the G4 and the African Union in the weeks leading up to the 60
th
 
Session of the General Assembly in 2005 largely explains why so little was accomplished 
despite high hopes and momentum. 
 
b. Africa: the Linchpin 
 
During the lead up to the 59
th
 Session of the UN General Assembly, With 53 
votes in the General Assembly and a unified continental position on Security Council 
reform, Africa has emerged as one of the key players in the reform process. The Ezulwini 
Consensus was reached at the 7
th
 Extraordinary Session of the African Union in March 
2005; mere months before the 59
th
 Session of the General Assembly where the G4, S5, 
and UfC groups presented their reform proposals. The G4 recognized that in order to pass 
their proposal through the General Assembly, they were going to need to support of 
Africa’s 53 votes. In July 2005, the foreign ministers from the G4 nations met at the 
Indian Mission to the UN in New York with representatives from fourteen African 
nations that had been elected by the African Union to represent Africa. Mr. Amr Roshdy, 
who represented Egypt, recalled that there were far more members of the press present 
than delegates from Africa; the international community had realized that Africa was 
central to this debate
62
. The negotiations faltered over two major points; veto rights for 
new permanent members and the allocation of nonpermanent seats to Africa.  
Though both the Ezulwini Consensus and the G4 reform proposal call for two 
permanent African seats, the Africans will not settle for new permanent seats without 
veto powers
63
. The G4 believed they would gain enough additional influence merely by 
virtue of permanent status to warrant accepting reform without veto powers. They were 
also convinced that they would eventually be granted veto powers once they became 
further integrated into the Security Council structure. Africa objected to this reasoning on 
two counts. Firstly, Africa believes that without veto powers, permanent delegates would 
have no more leverage and weight than nonpermanent delegates; the imbalanced scheme 
wherein the P5 make decisions and ask the others to sign would persist. Secondly, 
Africans fear the possibility that the G4 nations would be granted veto rights in the future 
but that those rights would be denied to the two African seats. Detractors would claim 
that this would never happen because it is morally inexcusable. Regardless, this fear 
remains part of the African opposition to the G4 plan.  
The second point of tension in the dialogue was that the G4 proposed a total of 
four nonpermanent seats for Africa but Africa will settle for no less than five. Africa is 
divided into five regions thus Ezulwini proposes that each region would elect one 
representative. Both South African diplomat Michiel Combrink and Egyption diplomat 
Amr Roshdy opined in personal interviews that Africa will not settle for a reform plan 
that would solve the problems of the G4 but cause internal turmoil and tension in 
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Africa.
64
 Additionally, though the G4 proposal would grant six Security Council seats to 
every region identified by the High-Panel: Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, the 
weight of those seats would vary greatly. Asia would have three permanent seats to 
Africa’s two – not to mention Europe with four permanent seats, two of which have veto 
power. To Africa, this scenario does not provide sufficient representation especially 
given the incredible diversity of Africa and the fact that so many UN Security Council 
decisions affect the continent
65
. The G4 are resistant to a sixth African nonpermanent seat 
because this addition would jeopardize G4 support from their own regions. Already with 
the United for Consensus movement working to gain votes from Asian, European, and 
Latin American states, the G4 are hard pressed to maintain regional support. India and 
Japan in particular would receive harsh criticism from their already skeptical region if 
Africa were granted five nonpermanent seats but Asia only three. Furthermore, the 
United States has long insisted that it will not accept a Security Council with more than 
21 members. The 24 member Council proposed by the High-Panel would be a tough sell 
to the US; adding more seats could possibly preclude any successful reform. 
Heated discussion continued throughout the day with no compromise from either 
side. At one point, recalls Ambassador Roshdy, a G4 foreign minister rose from his seat 
yelling, “If you can’t agree to this, then you don’t want reform!” To this an African 
representative responded, “With all due respect, you aren’t talking about reform of the 
Security Council, you are speaking of getting your country a permanent seat!
66
” These 
perceptions perfectly illustrate the suspicions each group harbors of the other. In sum, too 
much was at stake for either party to give ground and the conversation was a complete 
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failure. In a final effort to reach an agreement the same group met a week later in 
London, but with no further success. On August 4, 2005, the General Assembly received 
draft resolutions on how to reform the Security Council from the G4, The United for 




 The United Nations Security Council was not created to be a democratic 
institution: it was made to respond quickly and efficiently to issues of international peace 
and security. Today, a growing number of UN member states are dissatisfied with the 
lack of broad, democratic representation of states on the UNSC. Theses groups (notably, 
the G4, the Africa Group and the UfC) contend that it is time for the UNSC to respond to 
the zeitgeist of the 21
st
 Century, which may mean fundamentally changing its structure. 
Before reform is remotely possible, we must come to a collective agreement about why 
reform is necessary, and how we can achieve optimum representation, deliberation, and 
legitimacy in the UNSC body. The answers to these questions may very well lead to a 
crisis of identity in the UN body. If the UN fails to address this crisis, many believe it 
risks losing not only its legitimacy but it’s relevance to the modern international system. 
 There exists no normative standard for how the Security Council should be 
structured. Inevitably, no constituency involved in the reform debate is without national 
prejudice therefore every reform package contains elements of self-interest. It is 
impossible for one group to claim moral high ground because there is no moral standard 
by which to evaluate UNSC schemes. The High-Level Panel’s Report on reforming the 
United Nations for the twenty-first Century is the closest approximation to a standard for 
UNSC reform. Even so, there is no proposal that would satisfy all interest groups. Two 
fundamental issues are at play here: 1) States on the Security Council are accountable to 
their state and not their region. It is therefore impossible to create a UNSC fully 
accountable to the world even if membership is more geographically diverse. 2) Many 
reform proposals operate under the assumption that the UNSC is flawed because it is not 
democratic enough. The UNSC was never intended to be a democratic body. Attempting 
to change it to a democratic body fundamentally shifts the ideology of the UN Charter. 
It is not possible to create a completely fair and representative SC membership 
system if states serving on the Council represent themselves and there is a finite 
availability of seats. For example, if representation for Latin America and the Caribbean 
is allocated via a permanent seat to Brazil, Brazil will not act in the interests of Ecuador, 
the Dominican Republic, and Chile: it will act in the interests of Brazil. No one would 
suggest that all members of the UN should have a seat on the UNSC. This would simply 
be another General Assembly; too cumbersome and inefficient to effectively tackle issues 
of international security. One solution possible in the distant future would be to allocate 
permanent SC seats to supranational regional bodies such as the EU and ASEAN. The 
bodies are now in place but it take many decades before nations invest enough power and 
trust in those regional bodies to merit their seat on the SC legitimate. In the interim, 




Long-term reform will require a comprehensive evaluation of the very ideology 
and purpose of the UNSC and the UN generally. This reflection is essential but will take 
several years – even after it has commenced. Intermediate reform must be flexible and 
nonpermanent if the international community is to avoid augmenting the P5 quagmire in 
which it already finds itself. Immediate measures should ensure that the UNSC a) does 
not lose its relevance and b) litigates issues of world security as fairly as possible before 
true comprehensive reform is implemented. 
Immediate reform should accomplish the following: 1) increase the regional 
diversity of SC seats and 2) limit the grip of the veto on the Council.  
Regional diversity, while not the full measurement of diversity that could be considered 
in UNSC membership, has been commonly accepted as essential to reform. Other 
components such as religion and size can be incorporated into comprehensive reform in 
the future. Semi-permanent membership schemes such as those proposed by Model B of 
the Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel, the United for Consensus model, 
and the UK/France interim approach could suffice as immediate solutions. However, any 
interim measure must provide clear requirements for periodic review and a deadline for a 
permanent reform solution. The P5 veto is viewed by many as the bane of the Security 
Council however, the P5 will never willingly give up their veto power. The best hope for 
those who oppose the veto is to take measures now to begin limiting its influence. These 
could include requiring the SC to explain the vetoes it casts, pressuring the P5 to self-
impose a temporary moratorium on the veto, and pushing for schemes which allow either 
the rest of the Security Council or the General Assembly to overturn a single veto. The 
international community cannot afford to put off initiating reform schemes any longer.  
The 2011-2012 UNSC term has captured the attention and imagination of those 
attuned to the SC reform debate because so many of the states vying for permanent status 
will be serving together as nonpermanent members. G4 members Brazil, Germany and 
India will all serve along with South Africa and Nigeria; contenders for any proposed 
permanent African seats. (G4 member Japan is finishing its most recent term in 2010.) 
The dynamics and voting patterns that unfold before this Security Council will inform 
possible future directions of the reform debate. In the meantime, the philosophical and 
practical debates over what UN member states want from reform will rage onward. 
Why is there a United Nations Security Council? According to the preamble to 
the UN Charter, the United Nations is intended to, “reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights,” promote “social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,” and “to 
save generations from the scourge of war.” As an organ of the United Nations, the 
Security Council was formed to help serve that mission – not – to act on its own as a 
world police. These ambitious goals of the United Nations remain as honorable as when 
they were conceived of 65 years ago. Eventually we, the people of the United Nations, 
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